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FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF THE STATE REGULATION OF
NUCLEAR POWER: STATE LAW STRIKES BACK
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corporation
104 S. Ct. 615 (1984)
MARK KING*
Until its 1981-82 term, the United States Supreme Court had not
addressed the issue of the federal preemption of state laws which at-
tempted to regulate the nuclear power industry. The law in this area
consisted primarily of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota' which the Supreme Court had
summarily affirmed without opinion. In Northern States, the Eighth
Circuit found a broad preemptive intent in the Atomic Energy Act, as
amended,2 and held that the Atomic Energy Act preempted any state
action that directly regulated radiation hazards. As a result of Northern
States, the states were left little room to develop and apply their own
regulatory schemes.
During its 1983-84 term, however, the Supreme Court decided two
cases that focused on the preemptive scope of the Atomic Energy Act.
Taken together, these opinions represent a substantial departure from
the preemption doctrine set forth in Northern States.3 Since prior case
law in the area had uniformly followed the Eighth Circuit's holding
and analysis in Northern States,4 the Court's decisions in Pacific Gas
* Candidate for J.D., lIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1985.
1. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'dmem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
2. Id. at 1153-54.
3. See infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Northern States
holding.
4. The case law after Northern States uniformly followed its holding and analysis. See, e.g.,
Illinois v. General Electric Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982); Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chemical
Corp., 677 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1982); Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conser-
vation & Dev. Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903, 923 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom. Pacific Gas & Elec. v.
State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); United States v. City
of New York, 463 F. Supp. 604, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Marshall v. Consumers Power Company, 65
Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d 266 (1975); State Dept. of Envtl. Protection v. Jersey Central Power
& Light Co., 69 N.J. 102, 351 A.2d 337 (1976); Van Dissel v. Jersey Centra! Power & Light Co.,
152 N.J. Super. 391, 377 A.2d 1244 (1977).
The Northern States holding has not been without its critics. Primarily, the criticism has
focused on the broadness of the holding. The following commentaries have found that holding
unreconcilable with the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements governing federal preemp-
tion of state laws. Meek, Nuclear Power and State Radiation Protection Measures: The Impotence
of Preemption, 10 ENVTL. L. 1 (1979); Tribe, California Declines the Nuclear Gamble: Is Such a
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and Electric Company v. State Energy Resources Conservation and De-
velopment Commission5 and Silkwood v. Kerr-MfcGee Corporation6
have effectively recast the law of federal preemption. 7
In both Pacific Gas and Silkwood, the Court purported to apply the
same preemption analysis as did the Northern States court.8 However,
in applying that analysis to the facts before it, the Court significantly
broadened the permissible scope of state control over the nuclear in-
dustry. In Pacfic Gas, for example, the Court upheld a state-imposed
moratorium on the certification of new nuclear power plants even
though the state's action effectively regulated in the previously forbid-
den area of radiation hazards. The Court accepted the state's conten-
tion that the moratorium's primary purpose was to regulate the
economics of nuclear power generation. As a result, the Court held
that the Atomic Energy Act did not preempt the moratorium since it
was not imposed to regulate the safety of California nuclear power
plants. 9
Likewise, in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corporation,'0 the Court re-
versed the Tenth Circuit's holding that the Atomic Energy Act pre-
empted a ten million dollar punitive damage award in favor of the
estate of Karen Silkwood. 1I The Court instead found within the fed-
eral legislative scheme an implied congressional intent to preserve such
awards. 12 Significantly, the Court upheld Silkwood's punitive damage
award even though their imposition will surely increase the standard of
care exercised within the nuclear industry when dealing with radiation
hazards. 13
This comment examines the Court's analysis in Silkwood as well
as that decision's impact on the preemptive scope of the Atomic Energy
Act. After examining both the preemption doctrine in general and its
application in the nuclear energy field in particular, this comment will
analyze the Silkwood opinion on two levels. First, the reasoning and
holding of the majority will be criticized on the ground that the Court
State Choice Preempted?, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 679 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE]; Note, State
Regulation oNuclear Power Production." Facing the Preemption Challengefrom a New Perspective,
76 Nw. U.L. REV. 134 (1981) [hereinafter cited as NORTHWESTERN NOTE].
5. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
6. 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
7. See infra notes 153-204 and accompanying text.
8. Compare 461 U.S. at 203-04 and 104 S.Ct. at 621-22 with 447 F.2d at 1146-47.
9. 461 U.S. at 216.
10. 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
11. Id
12. Id at 626.
13. See infra notes 165-75 and accompanying text.
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misstated the question that it had been called upon to decide.' 4 Second,
this comment will examine the new parameters governing preemption
in the nuclear field given the Silkwood holding and conclude that the
Supreme Court has given the states wide latitude to regulate the gener-
ation of nuclear power within their borders. '5
THE HISTORY OF THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE AND ITS PAST
APPLICATION IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD
The basis upon which the preemption doctrine invalidates con-
trary state law is the supremacy clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.' 6 Balanced against this clause, however, are the express
limitations contained within the Constitution on the scope of federal
power as well as the tenth amendment's broad reservation of govern-
mental powers to the states.' 7 In essence, preemption decisions are at-
tempts to reconcile these two directives in factual circumstances that
often cause the clauses to appear contradictory rather than
complementary.
When Congress specifically speaks within a federal law of its in-
tent to preempt state legislation and expressly defines the extent of that
preemption, few problems arise.' 8 In such cases, the courts need only
look to the explicit statutory command. However, when Congress fails
to address expressly either the presence or scope of preemption within
the statute, the courts must somehow accommodate the tension be-
tween the competing constitutional clauses. They attempt to do so by
inquiring into the purposes of the federal statutory scheme and by delv-
ing into the congressional intent behind its enactment.19
14. See infra notes 153-83 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 184-204 and accompanying text.
16. U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2 provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ... any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. X provides:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
18. This is generally known as express preemption. An example of express statutory preemp-
tion is at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982) (literacy tests to exercise voting rights preempted). Because the
doctrine is clear, the Supreme Court has not often ruled on express preemption cases. However,
the Court has occasionally addressed the subject. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 528-32
(1977) (state labeling regulations held preempted), is one example. In order to find express pre-
emption, the Court has required that the preemptive intent be clearly expressed within the four
corners of the statute without recourse to the legislative history. See U.A.W. v. Russell, 356 U.S.
634, 646 (1958).
19. This is known as implied preemption.
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Implied Preemption
In general, the Supreme Court has recognized two grounds upon
which preemption of state law will be implied absent an expressed con-
gressional intent to do so. 20 The Court has found preemption where
the two bodies of law actually conflict so that compliance with both is
impossible. 21 In addition, the Court has implied a preemptive intent
when it has found evidence of a congressional design to occupy the
entire field of law. 22 Unfortunately, the Court's preemption decisions
have been doctrinally inconsistent in defining the degree and manner
in which congressional intent to occupy the field must be expressed to
support a finding of implied preemption.23 Instead, the Court has vac-
illated over the years, at times liberally implying a preemptive intent 24
while at other times refusing to preempt state enactments that actually
conflict with corresponding national laws.25
The Court's earliest treatment of federal preemption recognized a
broad preemptive intent in virtually all federal legislation. 26 Up
through the 1920s, the Court was predisposed to find that federal regu-
lation in a given area totally preempted concurrent state action in that
area.27 During the 1930s, however, this view radically changed to a
more state-oriented view of preemption. 28 The Court expressed this
view by requiring that preemptive intent be "clearly indicated" 29 and
"definitely expressed" 30 within the statutory language. Absent such a
20. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 376-94 (1978); TRIBE, supra
note 4, at 688-93; NORTHWESTERN NOTE, supra note 4, at 141-45, 157-60; Note, Implied Preemp-
tion of Punitive Damagesfor Nuclear Accidents, 29 AM. U.L. REV. 741, 748-50 (1980).
21. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
22. In areas where Congress has occupied the field, a state law is preempted from entering
that occupied area. The state law can neither foster actions that interfere with the federal scheme
nor impede behavior federal law wishes to encourage. Compare Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519 (1977) with Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, 389 U.S. 235 (1967).
In the Silkwoodcase, the argument for preemption rested on a congressional design to occupy
the field rather than upon the grounds of an actual conflict between state and federal law. 104 S.
Ct. at 626.
23. See infra notes 26-47 and accompanying text.
24. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 376-94 (1978); TRIBE, supra note 4, at 686-
93; NORTHWESTERN NOTE, supra note 4, at 136-42, 157-60.
25. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) (California state law
upheld permitting activity directly prohibited by New York Stock Exchange rule adopted in pur-
suance to federal securities laws).
26. For a fuller discussion of the historical evolution of the Court's preemption decisions see
Note, The Preemption Doctrine- Shifiing Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975) [hereinafter cited as COLUMBIA NOTE].
27. Charleston W.C. Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597 (1915).
28. COLUMBIA NOTE, supra note 26, at 627; NORTHWESTERN NOTE, supra note 4, at 140;
TRIBE, supra note 4, at 686.
29. Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614 (1940).
30. H.P. Welsh Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 85 (1939).
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showing, the Court upheld the state law.31
The next shift in the developing preemption doctrine occurred
during the 1940s. Within a six year period, the Court decided Hines v.
Davidowitz32 and Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp.33 Although both de-
cisions preserved the congressional intent requirement for a finding of
preemption, taken together they greatly expanded the permissible
scope of the Court's inquiry into legislative intent.34 Hines held that
preemption was proper where the state law "stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress."' 35 Rice went still further, holding that preemptive intent
could be inferred from such factors as the pervasive nature of the fed-
eral scheme or a dominant federal interest in the subject area. 36
Thus, Hines and Rice established a preemption analysis that was
much more flexible than that followed during the 1930s. 37 The pre-
emption standards articulated by the Hines and Rice Courts were so
broadly phrased and inherently adaptable that congressional intent to
preempt could be found in virtually any area of comprehensive federal
legislation. Indeed, it is only in the last fifteen years that the Court has
begun to narrow the broad tests outlined in those two cases.
The most recent Supreme Court decisions on preemption indicate
a strong willingness to uphold state legislation in the face of pervasive
federal regulation. In New York State Department of Social Services v.
Dublino,38 the Court backed away from the inference that a compre-
hensive federal regulatory scheme necessarily implied a congressional
intent to preempt state action. The Court noted that "[t]he subjects of
modem social and regulatory legislation often by their very nature re-
quire intricate and complex responses from the Congress, but without
Congress necessarily intending its enactment as the exclusive means of
meeting the problem. '39
Similarly, the Court in Goldstein v. California4° narrowed the ap-
plication of the dominant federal interest factor. In Goldstein, the
31. See, e.g., Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940); H.P. Welsh Co. v. New Hampshire,
306 U.S. 79 (1939).
32. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
33. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
34. COLUMBIA NOTE, supra note 26, at 630-32; NORTHWESTERN NOTE, supra note 4, at 141-
42.
35. 312 U.S. at 67.
36. 331 U.S. at 230.
37. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
38. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
39. Id at 415. Accord De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 359-60 (1976).
40. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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Court held that preemption was proper on the ground of a dominant
federal interest only in areas "necessarily national in import."' 4' More-
over, the Court emphasized that preemption was proper only when
state law will "necessarily" conflict with the dominant federal interest
and not merely when conflicts "might" possibly arise.42 In other con-
texts, the Court has noted that it will not seek out conflicts between
state and federal law in any area where none clearly exist. 43
The Court's decision in De Canas v. Bica" is an example of the
Court applying the more rigid state-oriented preemption standards
which it had developed in Dublino and Goldstein. In De Canas, the
Court set a very high threshold for proving congressional intent. The
Court required that the "clear and manifest purpose of Congress" be
present in the language and history of the federal act.45 Such a purpose
is demonstrated only when "the nature of the subject matter permits no
other conclusion or the Congress has unmistakably so ordained. ' 46 The
Court's language indicates that a greater showing of preemptive intent
is necessary today as compared to Hines, where the mere obstruction of
thefull purposes and objectives of Congress was sufficient.47
In the cases discussed above, as in all preemption cases, the Court
concentrated its analysis on the congressional intent to preempt as ex-
pressed in the statute at issue or its legislative history. A finding of
preemption is primarily a matter of statutory construction,48 since pre-
emption is, above all, essentially a legislative decision. The courts
which have confronted the subject have confined themselves to inter-
preting congressional intent. As a result, while broad trends concern-
ing the Supreme Court's general disposition to preempt or preserve
state law are discernable, 49 the dispositive factor in individual cases is
the particular statutory scheme at issue.50
41. Id at 554 (emphasis in original). Accord De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
42. 412 U.S. at 554.
43. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960).
44. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
45. Id at 357. Accord Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
46. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (emphasis
added).
47. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
48. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 688.
49. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
50. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 139 (1973); City
of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973); United States v. City of New
York, 463 F. Supp. 604, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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Federal Nuclear Energy Legislation
In the nuclear energy field, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954-5 and
its amendments are the particular statutory enactments requiring con-
struction. Thus, it is to that legislation that the general preemption
rules outlined above apply. As indicated in the previous section, the
pivotal concern in the Court's preemption analysis is an examination of
congressional intent, either expressed or implied, to preempt concur-
rent state regulation. This section will briefly discuss the evolution of
the Atomic Energy Act, 52 paying particular attention to the expressions
of congressional intent that accompanied the passage of the 1959 Coop-
eration with States Amendment 53 as well as the Price-Anderson Act of
1957. 54
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (hereinafter "the Act") was passed
to promote private sector involvement in the nuclear energy production
field."5 Prior to its passage, its predecessor act, the Atomic Energy Act
of 1946,56 governed the nonmilitary application of nuclear fission.
Under the earlier legislation, the federal government retained complete
control over the production and use of all fissionable materials. 57 The
1954 Act represented a significant departure from the previous law by
emphasizing the role of the private sector in the area. However, the
Act was silent, containing no language either defining or limiting the
extent to which the states could simultaneously regulate the private
production of nuclear energy.58
1959 Cooperation with States Amendment
In an attempt to clarify the regulatory power of federal and state
51. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (currently
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982)).
52. The scope of this article does not permit an exhaustive examination of what is, by any
measure, a complex statutory and regulatory scheme. For fuller discussions of the Atomic Energy
Act and its legislative history and reach contrary conclusions regarding its preemptive intent com-
pare NORTHWESTERN NOTE, supra note 4 with Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d
1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'dmem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
53. Pub. L. No. 86-373, 73 Stat. 688 (1959) (current version codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2021 (1982)).
54. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (current version codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2210 (1982)).
55. S. REP. No. 1699, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1954); 42 U.S.C. § 2013 (1976). See also
Murphy & LaPierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the States and the Supremacy Clause:. A
Case of Express Preemption, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 395 (1976) [hereinafter cited as MURPHY &
LAPIERRE].
56. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, § 3, 60 Stat. 755 (1946).
57. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development
Comm., 461 U.S. at 206-07; MURPHY & LAPIERRE, supra note 55, at 395.
58. NORTHWESTERN NOTE, supra note 4, at 144.
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authorities over nuclear energy, Congress added section 274 to the Act
in 1959.59 This amendment detailed the procedure by which the
Atomic Energy Commission 60 could transfer its regulatory authority
over certain types of nuclear material to the states. 61 The Commission
was prohibited, however, from ceding its authority over especially haz-
ardous activities and materials. 62 In addition, subsection (k) of the
1959 amendment expressly preserved all state or local regulatory activi-
ties designed "for purposes other than protection against radiation
hazards." 63
For purposes of preemption analysis, neither the 1959 amendment
taken as a whole, nor subsection (k) in particular, are sufficiently une-
quivocal to support a finding of express preemption. 64 Express pre-
emption generally requires an affirmative statement of the nature and
scope of the area preempted.65 Subsection (k), in contrast, sets forth
topics explicitly open to state regulation rather than listing specific for-
bidden areas. Likewise, the 1959 amendment's operative sections do
not focus on the subjects preempted by federal law. Instead, the
amendment details the regulatory duties which the Commission may or
may not wholly surrender to the states. 66 As a result, the preemptive
intent of Congress must be implied, if it is to be found at all.
The expressions of congressional intent within the legislative his-
tory of the 1959 amendment demonstrate that Congress definitely
wished to preempt state law to some degree. 67 However, the extent of
that preemption was left deliberately uncertain, at least in part because
59. Pub. L. No. 86-373, 72 Stat. 688 (1959) (now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1982)).
60. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, § 104(a), 88 Stat. 1237
(1974) (now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5814(a) (1982)), abolished the Atomic Energy Commission.
The Act transferred the AEC's responsibilities over regulation and licensing to the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission. The AEC's research and development duties were given to the Energy Re-
search and Development Administration. The latter organization was subsumed by the
Department of Energy under the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7112 (1982).
61. The amendment specifically allowed the AEC to transfer to the states its regulatory au-
thority over byproduct, source and special nuclear materials in amounts not sufficient to form a
critical mass. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1982). For definitions of these three types of radioactive
hazards, see 42 U.S.C. § 2014(e)(2)(aa) (1982).
62. See42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1984).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1982).
64. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1147 (8th Cir. 1971), a ff'dmem.,
405 U.S. 1035 (1972). Contra MURPHY & LAPIERRE, supra note 53.
65. Note, A Framework/or Preemption Anaysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978); NORTHWESTERN
NOTE, supra note 4, at 147.
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021(b) & (c) (1982).
67. Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy on Federal-State Relationships in the
Atomic Energy Field, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 307-08 (1959) (testimony of Robert Lowenstein, Office
of the General Counsel, AEC).
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the drafters experienced difficulty in precisely articulating the scope of
that preemption.68 Indeed, Congress apparently believed that the
amendment's preemptive scope was a fluid, rather than a fixed, con-
cept. One portion of the legislative history contains statements that ex-
horted the states to prepare themselves for even greater regulatory
responsibilities as their scientific expertise developed.69
On the other hand, the Senate report accompanying the amend-
ment clearly states that, with regard to the specific types of nuclear ma-
terial transferable to state regulatory authority, Congress intended only
one regulatory system to prevail. 70 Concurrent regulation by both fed-
eral and state authorities was expressly rejected. 7 While this rejection
of dual regulation is directly applicable only to the areas and material
mentioned in subsections (b) and (c) of the amendment, 72 it does, how-
ever, serve to indicate the reservations of the 1959 Congress about the
advisability of dual regulation in general.73
The Price-Anderson Act of 1957
Two years before it passed the cooperation with states legislation,
Congress had added the Price-Anderson amendment to the Atomic En-
ergy Act.74 The congressional purpose behind Price-Anderson was to
facilitate private involvement in the nuclear field. It was designed to
do so by removing the principal impediment to increased private par-
ticipation-the specter of tort liability of a virtually unlimited magni-
tude.75 Price-Anderson accomplishes this purpose by requiring
Commission licensees to carry minimum amounts of liability insur-
ance.76 The Commission then supplements that minimum coverage by
agreeing to indemnify each licensee against damage awards exceeding
that minimum level.77 The statute also sets an aggregate recovery ceil-
68. Id See also NORTHWESTERN NOTE, supra note 4.
69. S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2872, 2880 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
70. Id at 2879. The amendment insured that the Commission would relinquish its authority
only to states with approved programs. The Commission has to determine whether the state pro-
gram is adequate "to protect the public health and safety" with respect to the materials affected by
the regulatory transfer. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d) (1982).
71. SENATE REPORT, supra note 69.
72. See42 U.S.C. §§ 2021(b) & (c) (1982).
73. See Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy on Federal-State Relationships in
the Atomic Energy Field, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. 315 (1959).
74. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (current version now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210
(1982)).
75. S. REP. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3201, 3206.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b) (1982).
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210(c) & (e) (1982).
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ing for each accident. 78 In addition, a 1966 revision of the amendment
added a section requiring all licensees to forfeit certain defenses to
claims lodged in Price-Anderson litigation, effectively subjecting all
licensees to strict liability. 79
The Price-Anderson compensation scheme is not, however, trig-
gered by every personal injury suit brought against Commission licen-
sees. The accident causing the harm must be sufficiently severe to be
classified as an extraordinary nuclear occurrence (ENO).8 0  In the
Silkwoodcase, the criteria established by the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission (NRC) to define an ENO had not been met.8' Thus, the Price-
Anderson issue in Silkwood was whether the amendment impliedly
preempted punitive damages awarded in a suit not brought pursuant to
the NRC's ENO provisions.8 2
Price-Anderson's legislative history does not seem to contain the
sort of broadly worded expressions of preemptive intent which would
support a finding of preemption under the facts in Silkwood Congress
apparently drafted the amendment so as to minimize its interference
with state tort law. Its legislative history repeatedly stresses the limited
nature of the federal intrusion. The Senate report that accompanied
the original bill states that:
there is no interference with the State law until there is a likelihood
that the damages exceed the amount of financial responsibility re-
quired together with the amount of the indemnity. At that point the
Federal interference is limited to the prohibition of making payments
through the State courts and to prorating the proceeds available. 83
Other than such disavowals, the legislative history is of little help. The
Senate report, for example, made no specific mention of punitive dam-
age awards.84
78. Id
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1) (1982). See also S. REP. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3201, 3209-10.
80. The statutory definition, 42 U.S.C. § 20140) (1982), requires the Commission to declare
an ENO when there has been substantial off-site contamination and when there has been, or likely
will be, substantial damages to persons or property off-site. The NRC criteria is given at 10
C.F.R. §§ 140.81-85 (1983).
81. Compare the facts in Silkwooddiscussed infra at notes 111-14 and accompanying text with
the NRC's definition of "substantial", 10 C.F.R. § 140.85 (1983). Moreover, plutonium processing
plants were not required to register for indemnification under Price-Anderson until 1977, 42 FED.
REG. 46 (1977), while the Silkwood contamination incidents occurred in November of 1974.
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 104 S. Ct. 614, 618 (1984).
82. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
83. S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in [1957] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS




Prior to Silkwood, the Supreme Court had not analyzed the
Atomic Energy Act and its principle amendments for an implied con-
gressional intent to preempt state tort law. 85 The Court did, however,
have before it two major decisions on the Act's preemptive scope. Both
of the cases-Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota86 and Pacifc Gas
and Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Develop-
ment Commission 87-concerned state legislative enactments and degree
to which those statutory schemes were preempted by the 1959 Coopera-
tion with States amendment.
In Northern States, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
state regulations setting strict limits on the release of radioactive efflu-
ents from nuclear power plants were preempted by the Atomic Energy
Act. The court implied preemption on the grounds that the federal
government had exclusive authority to regulate radiation hazards
under the 1959 amendment.88
In addition to the language and legislative history of the 1959
amendment,8 9 the Northern States court cited the pervasive nature of
the federal statutory scheme and a dominant federal interest in the sub-
ject matter as support for its finding of preemption. 90 Northern States
also held that dual regulation of radiation hazards would frustrate a
primary purpose of the Atomic Energy Act, namely the promotion of
the development and use of nuclear power. 91 The court concluded that
the state effluent standards were impliedly preempted and therefore in-
valid. The Supreme Court subsequently summarily affirmed the
court's decision.92
As the only authoritative law in the field, Northern States became
85. There had, however, been state court decisions on the preemption of tort claims by the
Atomic Energy Act. See, e.g., Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 237 N.W.2d
266 (1975); Van Dissel v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 152 N.J. Super. 391, 377 A.2d 1244
(1977).
86. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'dmen., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
87. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
88. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), afl'dmem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). However, the 1977 Clean
Air Act amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. (1982)), have statutorily overruled Northern States. These amendments have brought all
radioactive affluents within the definition of "air pollutant" under the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7602(g) (1982). Thus, 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1982) now allows states to regulate such effluent emis-
sions more strictly than does the N.R.C.
89. See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
90. 447 F.2d at 1152-53.
91. Id at 1153-54.
92. 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). Summary affirmations are of limited precedential value. The
Court affirms only the outcome of the lower case and not necessarily the reasoning employed to
get to that holding. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977).
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the landmark decision on the scope of the federal preemption of state
regulations governing radiation hazards. The decisions which followed
uniformly cited the holding and analysis of Northern States, using it as
the starting point for their analysis of the facts before them.93 Many
commentators, however, questioned the reasoning of the court and the
wisdom of the wholesale acceptance of its analysis in the subsequent
cases. 94 Still, it was not until the Supreme Court's decision in Paciic
Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Devel-
opment Commission that the influence of Northern States was signifi-
cantly curtailed.95
In Pac!ic Gas and Electric, several utilities brought a declaratory
action seeking to invalidate, inter alia, a section of California's Warren-
Alquist Act 96 which imposed a moratorium on the certification of new
nuclear power plants in the state. The California law's moratorium
was to last until the Nuclear Regulatory Commission finally approved
and adopted a permanent disposal technique for the high level nuclear
waste generated by the plants.97 The statute's purpose, according to its
legislative history, was to regulate the economics of nuclear power, not
its safety aspects. 98 Without assurance of technology for disposing of
the waste, the state maintained that the plants would have to shut down
when their interim on-site storage capacity was filled. As a result, plant
construction constituted an economic risk since the cost and timing of
the permanent disposal technique could not be reasonably estimated in
advance.99 The utilities brought the challenge on the ground that the
Atomic Energy Act preempted the state imposed moratorium, even if
the state law was enacted for economic motives.
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous result, held the state law
valid. In so doing, the Court purported to explore and define the pre-
emptive scope of the Atomic Energy Act. The Court found that "the
federal government maintains complete control of the safety and 'nu-
clear' aspects of energy generation . . ." while the states retained au-
thority in non-nuclear areas. 00 In reaching its decision, the Court
concluded that, though a moratorium imposed because of safety con-
cerns would have been struck down, the economic purpose of the Cali-
93. See supra note 4 and the cases and materials cited therein.
94. Id But see MURPHY & LAPIERRE, supra note 53.
95. 461 U.S. at 212 n.24.
96. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 25524.2 (West 1977).
97. Id
98. 461 U.S. at 213.
99. Id at 213-14
100. Id at 212.
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fornia ban saved it from preemption.' 0 ' The Court confined its
examination of the statute to whether any non-safety rationale existed
for the California law. It expressly refused to search for an underlying
safety motive for the moratorium 02 citing United States v. O'Brien.10 3
Finally, the Court emphasized the consistency of its holding with its
summary affirmation of Northern States.'°4 The Court distinguished
Northern States by noting that there a state had attempted to directly
legislate in the preempted field of nuclear safety. Similar state efforts,
according to the Court, would be preempted under its holding in Pa-
cific Gas.
However, the Court's off-handed treatment of Northern States in a
footnote masks the extent to which it repudiated the Eighth Circuit's
reasoning. The basis of the Northern States holding was that the
Atomic Energy Act had two major purposes-one of which was to fos-
ter the development of nuclear power. 05 Northern States preempted
concurrent state regulation on the ground that states might overempha-
size safety standards at the expense of promoting the adoption of nu-
clear power. l0 6  This analysis seemed to suggest that any state
legislation which served "to unnecessarily stultify" the development of
nuclear energy was preempted regardless of the purpose behind its
enactment.
Clearly, the California plant certification moratorium considered
in Pacific Gas & Electric stultified the development of nuclear power
within the state. Arguably, the degree of burden imposed by the statute
is excessive to achieve its avowed economic purpose. The economic
impact of the waste disposal problem will be felt, if at all, only when
the plant's on-site temporary storage pools are filled.'0 7 Even then, if
the technology for the long-term disposal of nuclear waste remained
undeveloped, the on-site disposal pools could always be expanded. 0 8
The Pacific Gas decision, however, rejected such an approach.
101. Id at 213.
102. Id at 216.
103. 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
104. 461 U.S. at 212 n.24.
105. 447 F.2d at 1153-54.
106. Id.
107. Interim storage space is exhausted when the sum of the spent fuel in the tank and the
active fuel in the core equal the pool's capacity. The plant must maintain sufficient storage space
for the active fuel in case fuel rods in the core must be unloaded because of inspections or emer-
gencies. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development
Commission, 461 U.S. at 195.
108. The Pacfic Gas & Electric opinion makes no mention of this possible alternative to a state
imposed certification moratorium or any other less drastic state response to the waste disposal
problem.
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While holding that one of the primary purposes of the Atomic Energy
Act is, and always has been, to promote the development of nuclear
power, the Court concluded that this promotion was not to proceed at
all costs.109 Specifically, the Court found that a state could completely
halt the development of nuclear power if it did so for economic reasons
(or presumably for any non-safety based purpose). Thus, Pacific Gas
constituted a substantial narrowing of the Northern States holding. As
such, the preemption precedent in the nuclear field was brought more
in line with the Court's recent reluctance to hold state law preempted in
any area. " 10
FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE SILKWOOD CASE
Less than six months after its decision in Pacfic Gas & Electric, the
Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp."II Silkwood arose out of the plutonium contamination of Karen
Silkwood's person and property on three separate occasions in Novem-
ber of 1974.112 At that time, Silkwood worked as a laboratory analyst
at Kerr-McGee's fuel rod fabrication plant in Cimarron, Oklahoma." l3
Kerr-McGee stipulated at trial that the plutonium which contaminated
Silkwood came from its plant." 4
Within eight days of her initial contamination, Karen Silkwood
died in an automobile accident unrelated to the subsequent litigation of
this case." 5 After her death, the administrator of Silkwood's estate-
109. 461 U.S. at 222.
110. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
111. 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
112. Of the three contaminations, two were on-site and one was off-site. The off-site contami-
nation occurred at Silkwood's apartment. On November 5, 1974, a routine radiation check at the
plant revealed that Silkwood had been contaminated with plutonium. Just prior to monitoring
herself Silkwood had been working with plutonium through a "glove box." This box is designed
to contain the radiation from the plutonium while allowing indirect access to the material by way
of glove holes in the side of the box. The next day Silkwood again discovered that she had been
contaminated with plutonium while on the job, this time, however, she had not been working with
plutonium or the glove boxes. Finally, on November 7, Silkwood was monitored as contaminated
when she arrived for work at the plant that morning. A subsequent investigation revealed several
rooms of her apartment were irradiated. Furthermore, four urine samples and a fecal sample
collected by Silkwood as a follow up to her first two contaminations were highly radioactive. The
plutonium in the urine and feces was insoluable and therefore had not been excreted along with
the urine and feces. Rather, the samples had been deliberately spiked with plutonium by a person
or persons unknown. Id at 617-18.
113. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 677 F.2d 908, 913 (10th Cir. 1981).
114. Id
115. At the time of her death, Silkwood was driving to meet a New York Times reporter to
discuss her allegations of unsafe procedures and practices at the Kerr-McGee plant at which she
worked. She had promised to bring documents allegedly demonstrating the lax procedures at the
plant. The documents were not among her personal effects recovered after the accident. TIME,
January 18, 1975, at 8-9.
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her father, Bill Silkwood-filed suit against Kerr-McGee for damages
flowing from the contamination incidents. The suit was based on com-
mon law tort principles of the State of Oklahoma and brought there in
federal district court on diversity of citizenship grounds."16
Following a lengthy trial," 7 the jury found in favor of the plaintiff.
It returned a verdict for $505,000 in actual damages-5,000 for the
property in Silkwood's apartment that had to be destroyed because of
plutonium contamination and $500,000 for the personal injury suffered
by Silkwood, primarily fear and suffering, as a result of her contamina-
tion. 18 In addition, the jury awarded $10,000,000 in punitive damages
against Kerr-McGee,' 1 9 presumably on the basis of an instruction that
authorized the jury to grant such damages if it found that the defendant
had acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights.' 20 The district
court entered judgment on the verdict over defendant's objections and
defendant appealed.121
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
judgment for property damages, but reversed the award for personal
injuries and punitive damages. 22 The court held that Silkwood's per-
sonal injuries were suffered during the course of her employment and
were therefore exclusively compensable under the state's workman
compensation law.123  In regard to punitive damages, the court con-
cluded that such an award was preempted because it constituted state
regulation of radiation hazards. 24 The appeals court adopted the same
sort of broad preemption analysis found in Northern States and con-
116. 104 S. Ct. at 618.
117. The evidence presented at trial raised many questions which were never satisfactorily
resolved. These questions revolve around the source of Silkwood's contamination. Kerr-McGee
maintained that Silkwood accidently contaminated herself and her apartment while trying to
spike her urine samples with plutonium as part of a scheme to embarrass and discredit the com-
pany. Plaintiff, on the other hand, advanced evidence suggesting that Kerr-McGee employees
might have intentionally contaminated Silkwood in an effort to harass and intimidate her. 677
F.2d at 913-15. Though none of these allegations were ever proven, they fueled media speculation
concerning the circumstances of Silkwood's contamination and death. See, e.g., Kohn, Karen
Silkwood's Dark Victory, ROLLING STONE, July 26, 1979 at 55 (suggesting that the company may
have intentionally attempted to poison her); Kohn, Malignant Giant: The Nuclear Industry's Terri-
ble Power and How It Silenced Karen Silkwood, in THE SILENT BOMB (P. Faulkner ed. 1977)
(alleging that Silkwood's death was not accidental and speculating that she was forced off the road
when another vehicle rammed her from behind). The jury resolved only one of these questions
directly. It held that Silkwood had not intentionally contaminated herself. 667 F.2d at 915.
118. 104 S. Ct. at 619.
119. Id
120. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 484 F. Supp. 566, 603 (W.D. Okla. 1979).
121. 104 S. Ct. at 619.
122. 667 F.2d at 915-23.
123. Id.
124. 104 S. Ct. at 620.
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cluded that the Atomic Energy Act preempted any state action that
substantially competed with Nuclear Regulatory Commission regula-
tions.1 25 The estate subsequently took the case to the Supreme Court
on the punitive damage issue alone.' 26
REASONING OF THE SILKWOOD COURT
The Majority Opinion
After initially disposing of a minor jurisdictional issue, 27 the
Court turned directly to the question of whether the Atomic Energy
Act preempted the punitive damage award won by plaintiff at trial.
The Court began by setting forth the two broad preemption tests it had
developed in Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp. 128 and Hines v. Davido-
WitZ.12 9 According to these tests, the Court held preemption proper
when Congress had either manifested an intent to occupy a particular
field or where the state law frustrated the realization of the full pur-
poses and objectives of the federal law. 130 After applying both of these
tests to the facts before it, the Silkwood Court upheld the $10,000,000
punitive damage award.
Occupation of the Field
The Court began its analysis by identifying the scope of the field
that Congress had occupied, by implication, through passage of the
Atomic Energy Act and its amendments. To do so, the majority cited
Pacfic Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Development Comm. ' 31 There, the Court held that the federal govern-
ment had "occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns.' 32 The
125. Id, citing, 667 F.2d at 923.
126. 104 S. Ct. at 620.
127. The Court had noted probable jurisdiction on Silkwood's appeal from the Tenth Circuit
decision and postponed consideration of the jurisdictional issue until the argument on the merits.
104 S. Ct. at 620. In regard to jurisdiction, the Court concluded that the Silkwoodcase did not fall
within the scope of its appellate jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1976). A decision is reviewable
by appeal from the federal circuit courts if a state statute is held unconstitutional. Id The Court
held that the Tenth Circuit had only invalidated an exercise of authority under the Oklahoma
punitive damage statute rather than invalidating the entire statute. 104 S. Ct. at 620-21. As a
result, Silkwoodwas outside the jurisdictional grant of 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1976). However, the
Court, electing to treat appellant's jurisdictional statement as a writ of certiorari, reached the
merits of the case. 104 S. Ct. at 631.
128. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
129. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
130. 104 S.Ct. at 621. For further discussion of the Court's treatment of the preemption doc-
trine, see supra notes 16-50 and accompanying text.
131. 461 U.S. at 190 (1983). The Pacifc Gas & Electric decision is discussed more fully at,
supra notes 96-110 and accompanying text.
132. 461 U.S. at 212.
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Court then briefly reviewed the legislative history of the 1959 Coopera-
tion with States amendment 133 and concluded that Congress had de-
fined this particular field as it had because it believed that the
complexity of the subject matter exceeded the technical sophistication
of the states. 134
The Silkwood majority then, however, observed that the complex-
ity factor, if carried to its logical conclusion, would foreclose all state
tort law claims (based, as they necessarily are, on a state-originated
standard of care), and not just punitive damage awards. 135 The Court
refused to extend the preemptive scope of the Atomic Energy Act so
far. Instead, the Court found that the express language and legislative
history of the Price-Anderson Act 136 clearly exhibited a congressional
intent to preserve in full the great body of state tort law-excepting the
specific deviations carefully outlined in Price-Anderson itself. Finding
no reference to the preemption of punitive damages in either Price-
Anderson or its legislative history, the Court held that Congress's gen-
eral reservation and use of state tort law under the amendment in-
cluded the preservation of punitive damage awards.137 In so doing the
Court specifically refused to examine the different purposes served by
personal and property damages (compensation for injuries) and puni-
tive damages (regulation and modification of conduct) and to decide
the case on the basis of that distinction. 38
Frustration of Congressional Purposes
Having concluded that the punitive damage award was not part of
the field occupied by Congress through the Atomic Energy Act, the
Silkwood Court then proceeded to apply the second preemption test-
actual conflict or frustration of the full purposes of Congress. The
Court immediately dismissed the notion that the punitive damage
award was preemptable as actually conflicting with the federal regula-
tory system. 139 Nor did the Court find that large punitive damage
awards conflicted with the primary purpose of the Atomic Energy
133. See supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
134. S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2872, 2874.
135. 104 S.Ct. at 622-23.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982). The Price-Anderson Act and its legislative history are more
fully discussed at, supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text. The majority opinion in Silkwood
discussed Price-Anderson at 104 S. Ct. at 623-26.
137. 104 S. Ct. at 626.
138. Id.
139. Id The Court observed that paying civil damages in addition to NRC fines was not a
physical impossibility and, therefore, not an actual conflict.
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Act-the promotion of nuclear energy production. The Court recon-
ciled the apparent inconsistency between the two by observing that
Congress, in expressly preserving state tort law actions, had chosen to
limit the promotional impact of the Act in order to insure that adequate
remedies existed for those injured as a result of the presence of nuclear
power. l40 Likewise, the Court concluded that the express reservation of
state tort claims by Congress prevented preemption in Silkwood even
though Congress had expressly rejected dual state and federal regula-
tion in the legislative history of the Act. 14'
The Blackmun Dissent
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, argued in dissent
that the Court had focused its analysis on the wrong issue, by deciding
whether a party injured by a nuclear accident can be compensated
under state law for the harm suffered. 42 Blackmun pointed out that
the question before the Court concerned only the propriety of punitive
damages rather than compensatory awards. In failing to examine the
purpose served by punitive damages, the Court lost sight, according to
Blackmun, of the teaching of Pacifc Gas and Electric.143 Pacific Gas
held that the purpose and not the effect of the state action was disposi-
tive of the preemption question. Silkwood, though, ignored the pur-
pose behind the imposition of punitive damages and instead
concentrated on the similar effects of punitive and compensatory
awards. In Silkwood, the majority's reasoning seemed to be that since
both compensatory and punitive damages can have a regulatory effect,
the Act could not preempt one without also preempting the other.
The distinction Blackmun recognized is that the purpose of com-
pensatory damages is, as the name implies, to compensate. Punitive
damages are imposed, in contrast, to punish egregious conduct and,
through punishment, to compel a change in that conduct. Generally,
the amount of punitive damages assessed is unrelated to the degree of
harm caused by the acts in question. 144 Thus, while both a large com-
pensatory award and a large punitive award may have the same regula-
tory effect in a given case, the purpose behind their respective
imposition is quite different. Given his construction of the Pacfic Gas
holding, this difference was the crucial distinction for Blackmun.
140. 104 S. Ct. at 626.
141. Id
142. Id at 631, 634.
143. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
144. 104 S. Ct. at 630.
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Blackmun's position was that Pacific Gas's holding preempted any
state action with the purpose of regulating the safety aspects of nuclear
power. Under that guideline, punitive damages are preempted since
they are imposed only to regulate conduct.145 Blackmun concluded by
dismissing the primary authority relied upon by the majority in reach-
ing its conclusion, the legislative history of the Price-Anderson Act. 146
Blackmun read the statements of congressional intent contained therein
as referring only to the interaction between the specific compensatory
scheme contained in Price-Anderson and state law. He did not read it,
as did the majority, as a description of the relationship between all fed-
eral nuclear regulation and state law.147 Simply put, Blackmun did not
interpret the broad language pledging to leave undisturbed all state tort
law not expressly altered by the Price-Anderson amendment as immu-
nizing punitive awards from the Pacific Gas preemption analysis and
would, therefore, have applied that analysis to preempt the Silkwood
award.
The Powell Dissent
Justice Blackmun, along the Chief Justice Burger, also joined in a
dissent authored by Justice Powell. Powell's argument began by recog-
nizing the regulatory purpose behind punitive damages in general and
the peculiar context in which the majority permitted their imposition in
Silkwood. In essence, he argued that Pacfic Gas and Electric had held
that the states could impose safety regulations on the nuclear industry
only to the extent expressly allowed by Congress. 148 Powell's criticism
was that the majority had turned that requirement on its head by al-
lowing a state to impose safety standards via punitive damages simply
because the Court could find-no expressions of congressional intent
specifically preempting punitive damage awards. 149 Thus, Powell con-
tended that the majority had departed from the Pacfic Gas precedent.
Powell then argued that the pervasive nature of the federal scheme
fundamentally conflicted with state authority to award punitive dam-
ages on the facts in Silkwood.1 50 Powell claimed that federal nuclear
energy regulation was the result of a delicate balance between perva-
sive safety standards on one hand and a congressional mandate to pro-
145. Id at 631.
146. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
147. 104 S. Ct. at 633.
148. 461 U.S. at 211-12.
149. 104 S. Ct. at 637.
150. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
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mote nuclear energy on the other. '5 ' This scheme, according to Powell,
afforded no place for the ad hoc regulation offered by juries armed with
the authority to impose punitive damages. This is particularly true
where, as here, the jury was charged to ignore the federal regulations if
it found them inadequate to insure public safety.152 Powell concluded
by observing that the majority's decision left the nuclear industry oper-
ating in a standardless environment since the majority's decision al-
lowed a jury wholly lacking the necessary expertise to impose and
enforce its own standard of care on the nuclear industry.
ANALYSIS
The Silkwood case gave the Court an opportunity to consider for
the second time in nine months the preemptive scope of the Atomic
Energy Act. As such, the case presented the Court with a chance to
clarify, expand and reaffirm its reasoning in Pacfc Gas. Unfortu-
nately, however, the Court did not seize that opportunity. Though
Silkwood cited Pafc Gas, the Supreme Court did not articulate and
apply the analytical pattern it had outlined less than a year earlier.
Nonetheless, Silkwood did reach the same result as did its predecessor
case-the state action was allowed to stand. Coupled with Pacific Gas
then, Silkwood sent a clear signal that the Atomic Energy Act's pre-
emptive effect is to be narrowly drawn and rarely applied. As a result,
a state can now impose significant restrictions on the nuclear power
industry without having its actions preempted.
The Analytical Irreconciliability of Silkwood and Pacific Gas
Justice White's majority opinion in Silkwood cited to the analysis
in Pacic Gas as support for its conclusion that punitive damages were
not preempted by the Atomic Energy Act. 153 However, even though
White purported to follow Pacfic Gas, both of the dissents in Silkwood
justly criticized the majority for its failure to clearly and logically apply
the holding in Pacifc Gas to the facts in Silkwood'5 4 Despite the fact
that Justice White authored the majority opinion in both cases,
151. 104 S. Ct. at 638-39, citing, Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1153-
54 (8th Cir. 1971), af'dmem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
152. 104 S. Ct. at 639. The jury evidently did ignore NRC standards since the Commission
found no significant violations occurred either before or after Silkwood's contamination. The
NRC imposed no fines on Kerr-McGee. 104 S. Ct. at 619.
153. 104 S. Ct. at 621-26.
154. Id at 627-32 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Id. at 634-41 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Silkwood ignored the foundation of the Pacific Gas preemption
analysis.
Pacic Gas examined the legislative history of the Act as well as its
1959 amendment governing cooperation with the states'55 and con-
cluded that Congress had distinguished between the spheres of activity
open to the states and those exclusively federal. In particular, the
Court cited subsection (k) of the 1959 amendment as illustrating that
distinction. 56 Subsection (k) provides that: "[n]othing in this section
shall be construed to effect the authority of any state or local agency to
regulate activities for purposes other than protection against radiation
hazards." 57
Based on such language, the Court ultimately decided that, except
where the federal government had expressly ceded certain powers to
the states, 58 the federal government had "occupied the entire field of
nuclear safety concerns."' 59 Applying that preemption standard, the
Court upheld the California law. The Court did so by accepting with-
out question or analysis California's assertion that the certification
moratorium was enacted for a non-safety purpose and, as a result, lay
outside the preempted field.
The Court indicated, however, that the state statute's purpose
would not be dispositive of the preemption issue in every case. In par-
ticular, the Court held that state laws regulating construction and oper-
ation standards of a nuclear power plant were preempted, even if
enacted for otherwise valid, non-safety purposes. 60  The Court de-
scribed that domain as exclusively federal in character and foreclosed
any state infringement in the area.' 6' However, on the facts of Pacfic
Gas, the Court concluded that the California moratorium did not in-
vade that forbidden domain. 62
Thus, Pacific Gas provided a rather straight-forward analytical
scheme. Initially, the question is whether the state action seeks to regu-
late in the exclusively federal area of construction or operation stan-
dards; if it does, it is preempted. If it does not, the next step is to
155. See supra notes 51-84 and accompanying text.
156. 461 U.S. at 210.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1982).
158. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1982) (authorizing the states to assume regulatory power
over limited types of nuclear material pursuant to an agreement with the Commission); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7 602(g) & 7416 (1982) (Clean Air Act as amended in 1977 authorizing state regulation of radio-
active air pollution from nuclear plants).
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determine the purpose behind the application of state authority. The
state action stands if, as in Pacific Gas, there exists any non-safety ra-
tionale for its existence. 63
The tenor of the Pacific Gas opinion suggested, however, that its
two-part test was not implicated if the state action was not regulatory
by nature or effect. In Silkwood, the state action at issue was the impo-
sition of punitive damages pursuant to Oklahoma state law' 64 and not,
as in Pacfic Gas, a legislatively enacted scheme with direct regulatory
effects on the nuclear industry. Thus, under a Pacfic Gas type analysis,
the Silkwood case presented a preliminary issue of whether the imposi-
tion of punitive damages was a form of state regulation at all.
Punitive Damages as a Form of State Regulation
Despite the fact that the dispositive element of the preemption is-
sue in Pacific Gas was the purpose of the state regulation, logic suggests
that the classification of a particular state action as regulatory or not
ought to turn on whether its effect is regulatory. In general, the effect
of a punitive award is indeed regulatory since it is levied, as the name
implies, to punish defendants and to deter others from like conduct. 165
In fact, courts will disallow punitive damages were the regulatory effect
is absent; that is, against defendants who will neither be punished nor
deterred by their imposition. 66 Thus, punitive damages operate in
much the same way as do fines or other financial penalties imposed by
federal or state regulatory agencies.
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,167 the Supreme
Court itself recognized the regulatory effect felt by defendants who are
forced to pay large damage awards. The Court stated that "regulation
can be as effectively asserted through an award of damages as through
some form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation
can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct
and controlling policy.' 1 68 While Garmon's holding dealt with a com-
pensatory award rather than a punitive one, the Court's language fo-
cused on the regulatory effect of the payment itself and not upon
163. Id at 214-16.
164. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (1981).
165. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 at 9-14 (4th ed. 1971);
Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1636 (1983).
166. Riley, Punitive Damages: The Doctrine of Just Enrichment, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 203
(1977); accord Nixon v. State, 555 P.2d 1283 (Okla. 1976) (municipality exempt from punitive
damages).
167. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
168. Id at 247.
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whether the payment was exacted for compensatory or punitive rea-
sons. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, in Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,169 used the Garmon analysis to
preempt a punitive damage award imposed against an airline company,
holding that such damages were state regulation in the exclusively fed-
eral domain of airline regulation. 70
As in Nader, the punitive damages at issue in Silkwood constituted
state regulation under the Court's reasoning in Garmon. The
Oklahoma statute on punitive damages states that such awards are
proper where the defendant was "guilty" of actual or presumed oppres-
sion, fraud or malice.' 7 ' The purpose behind giving punitive damages
is, according to the statute, "for sake of example, and by way of punish-
ing the defendant."'' 72 The Silkwoodjury was, therefore, authorized to
award punitive damages only if a regulatory effect attached.
Not only do the punitive damages awarded in Silkwood constitute
a form of state regulation, they are state regulation that stands in direct
competition with the federal regulations promulgated and enforced by
the N.R.C. The N.R.C. investigated the Silkwood affair and found that
Kerr-McGee had violated no significant federal regulations. 173 As a re-
sult, the Commission imposed no fine upon the corporation for its part
in Silkwood's contamination. 74  The Silkwood jury nonetheless
awarded $10,000,000 in punitive damages. Clearly, the jury award is a
potent and competing form of regulation for what, under federal guide-
lines, were only minor violations. This conclusion is especially appar-
ent given that the N.R.C. has never, under any circumstances, imposed
a fine greater than $850,000. '75
Silkwood's Punitive Damages and the Pacfic Gas Holding
As a form of state regulation, the punitive damage award in
Silkwood fell directly into the preempted field of the Atomic Energy
Act under both of the Pacific Gas tests. Under the first of these tests,
the state action is preempted, regardless of its purpose, if it regulates in
the area of construction or operation standards. Since the Silkwood
award was designed to punish Kerr-McGee for the perceived inade-
169. 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'don other grounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
170. Id.
171. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (1981).
172. Id.
173. 104 S. Ct. at 619.
174. Id.
175. Id
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quacy of its operational standards, 176 the Court should have found pre-
emption inasmuch as the federal government had not expressly ceded
states the authority to regulate the safety aspects of nuclear power gen-
eration via punitive damage awards.
However, even advancing to the second part of the Pacific Gas pre-
emption test does not salvage the Silkwoodaward. 77 There is no "non-
safety rationale" for the imposition of punitive damages in the instant
case. The purpose of the Silkwood punitive damage award was to regu-
late and deter egregious conduct. 17 8 As such, its imposition in this case
was clearly for a safety purpose. 79 Thus, under the Pacfic Gas analy-
sis, the Silkwood damage award should have been preempted.
The Silkwood majority, however, did not apply either of the Pa-
cflc Gas tests on its way to upholding the punitive damage award. In-
stead, the Court sidetracked itself onto a question it had not been called
upon to decide. At the outset, the Silkwood Court acknowledged the
precedential force of Pacfic Gas and then, inexplicably, looked to the
Atomic Energy Act itself to determine if Congress had expressed or
implied an intent to preempt punitive damage awards. Finding no
mention of punitive damage awards in particular, the Court relied on
Price-Anderson's general reservation of state tort law as encompassing
a reservation of punitive damages. 80
In effect, the majority's reasoning ignored Pacfic Gas and its hold-
ing entirely. As Justice Blackmun observed in his dissent, the numer-
ous remarks in Price-Anderson's legislative history on the role of state
tort law refer only to the limited effect of Price-Anderson itself. The
relationship between the Atomic Energy Act and state tort law (includ-
ing punitive damages) should have been governed by the Pacic Gas
decision. 18'
Of course, the Court has overruled precedent sub silentlo in the
past and may have intended to do so in Silkwood However, Pacftc
Gas was only nine months old when the Court released the Silkwood
decision. It is doubtful that the Court would have changed directions
176. Id at 625-26.
177. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 165-75 and accompanying text.
179. In contrast, compensatory awards survive the "purpose" test since they are levied to com-
pensate plaintiffs for injuries actually suffered. Like the California statute in Pacific Gas, the regu-
latory effects of compensatory damages are incidental since their purpose is non-safety based.
180. Thus, the majority opinion, focusing as it does on the wrong question, proves only that
Price-Anderson does not preempt the Silkwood award. The majority does not explore the pre-
emptive effect of the Atomic Energy Act as a whole.
181. 104 S. Ct. at 627-32.
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so quickly and dramatically without acknowledging its course. This is
not to say that the Pacific Gas analysis is beyond criticism. Before the
decision was issued, at least one commentator had argued that the Con-
gressional expressions on the preemptive scope of the Atomic Energy
Act were so vague that the Supreme Court, when finally faced with the
issue, should have recognized no preemption whatsoever. 82
The Court, however, has never shown any disposition toward this
point of view. 83 Moreover, implicit in the Pacic Gas opinions and the
Silkwood opinions is the understanding that the Atomic Energy Act
does preempt state law to some degree. The writers disagreed only in
regard to the proper scope of the preemption.
Simply put, the Silkwood Court did not analyze the punitive dam-
age award at issue as though it was a form of state regulation. As a
result, the Court did not apply the preemption tests presented in Pacic
Gas to the facts in Silkwood. Had it done so, the Court would have
held the punitive damages preempted. Because the majority ignored
the reasoning of its decision in Pacific Gas, the Silkwood opinion ana-
lytically contradicts the clear legacy of the earlier case and demon-
strates that the Supreme Court will go to great lengths to uphold state
activities in the nuclear field.
Nuclear Preemption after Silkwood and Pacific Gas
Even though Silkwood did not follow the letter of the Paciic Gas
holding, the two cases are consistent with one another in that they
reached the same result. Both decisions found that federal preemption
did not invalidate the particular state action at issue. In that sense,
these decisions are in line with the Court's recent trend in favor of pre-
serving state law in the face of preemption challenges.' 84
In order to fully reconcile Pacific Gas with Silkwood, a distinction
must be drawn between Padfic Gas's description of the preemptive
scope of the Atomic Energy Act and the Court's treatment of the facts
and issues raised in the two cases. In Pacific Gas, the Court declined to
take a "hard look" at California's professed economic purpose in im-
posing the certification moratorium. As a result, the Court upheld the
state action at issue as falling outside of the preempted field. Likewise,
in Silkwood, the Court never examined the punitive damage award as
182. See, e.g., NORTHWESTERN NOTE, supra note 4.
183. See Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem.,
405 U.S. 1035 (1972); Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1 (1975).
184. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
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possibly invading the exclusively federal domain of construction and
operation standards as defined in the first part of the Pacific Gas test. 185
In each case, the Court approached the preemption issue in a manner
that virtually assured that the state action would survive the preemp-
tion challenge.
At its core, the Pacfic Gas decision recognized a broad preemptive
intent in the Atomic Energy Act to occupy the entire field of nuclear
safety concerns.' 8 6 However, a close examination of the Court's rea-
soning demonstrates that Pacfic Gas went on to define the field of nu-
clear safety concerns very narrowly indeed. As a result, a state can now
impose substantial regulations on the nuclear industry if any non-safety
purpose will justify its action. 187
The California moratorium in Pacfic Gas survived preemption on
the basis of the state's contention that it was, in substance, an economic
regulation. The state argued that nuclear plants might incur unpredict-
ably high costs or perhaps even shut down as their on-site interim stor-
age capacity dwindled and finally disappeared. ' 88 The Court accepted
the state's avowed purpose for its action and notably failed to consider
if the state's reasoning actually justified a complete moratorium on the
certification of new nuclear power plants.
In fact, had the Court examined the state's claim more closely, it
would have seen that the fear of a plant closure for lack of a permanent
repository for its spent fuel rods was entirely hypothetical. After ap-
proximately a quarter of a century, no plant has yet been forced to
close because of the waste disposal problem. The Pacific Gas Court
admitted as much in a footnote.189 Indeed, the federal government has,
for years, warned that some plant closures were "imminent". But, dur-
ing that time, utilities have simply expanded their interim on-site stor-
age capacity to accommodate their increased needs.' 90
The Court never questioned the supposed economic justification
offered for the moratorium in light of an obvious alternative course of
action open to the state. The state could have required utilities, as a
condition for certification, to increase on-site storage capacity or, alter-
natively, to prepare contingency plans for increasing that capacity
should the need arise. The availability of these less drastic means to
185. See supra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
186. 461 U.S. at 212.
187. This is particularly true when Pacfic Gas is coupled with the impact of the 1977 Clean
Air Act amendments. See discussion of that issue infra at note 204.
188. 461 U.S. at 213-14.
189. Id at 195-96 n.2.
190. Id.
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the same economic benefit raises the possibility that the state's true pur-
pose in imposing the moratorium may have differed from its avowed
justification. The Court, however, refused to seriously consider that
possibility. 19
Thus, the Court held California's non-safety rationale sufficient to
save the statute even though the Court concluded that the same law
would have been preempted had its purpose been to regulate safety. 92
This purpose-oriented approach to preemption in the nuclear field is
superficially very attractive. But, in its application, it is somewhat arti-
ficial, particularly since the outcome of Pac'ic Gas demonstrated that
the Court would not delve very deeply into the seriousness of the
avowed purpose of the state action at issue. Thus, while claiming to
recognize a limited state right "to regulate activities for purposes other
than protection against radiation hazards,"'193 the Court effectively, but
tacitly, has given states the right to regulate radiation hazards if any
non-safety justification can be found for their actions.
Considering the current poor economic condition of the nuclear
industry, a state can use this newly given right to impose substantial
restrictions on the development of nuclear power within its boundaries.
These restrictions can be justified as valid economic regulations per-
missible under Pacific Gas and, as a result, escape preemption. In Pa-
cifc Gas, California justified its moratorium on the specific ground that
the absence of a permanent waste disposal system made nuclear power
economically unviable. The Pacifc Gas holding is, however, much
broader. A state can probably enforce a total restriction on nuclear
plant construction on the more general ground that such construction is
inherently economically unviable. By tying its restrictions to the recent
economic track record of the industry, a state which imposed such a
moratorium could bar nuclear plant construction indefinitely if it so
desired.
Any state which elected to justify a moratorium on such a basis
would have little difficulty making its case. Within the last year alone,
the Washington Public Power Supply System defaulted on $2.25 billion
worth of bonds (the largest municipal bond default in history) after
cancelling or postponing construction on four of its five proposed nu-
clear power plants; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission denied Com-
191. Id at 214-16. This is not to say that the waste disposal issue spotlighted by the California
law is not a problem. This article does argue, however, that it represents a safety problem rather
than an economic one.
192. Id at 212-13.
193. Id. at 210, quoting, 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1982).
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monwealth Edison of Illinois an operating license on its $3.7 billion
Byron nuclear power plant; and Public Service Company of Indiana
shelved plans to complete its half-finished Marble Hill nuclear power
plant and wrote off the $2.5 billion it had already invested. 194 These
debacles have left the sponsoring utilities in precarious economic cir-
cumstances that must ultimately be borne by their customers and
stockholders.
Beyond these dramatic setbacks are the frighteningly regular cost
overruns and construction delays. Some of the more egregious exam-
ples include the Public Service Company of New Hampshire's Sea-
brook nuclear power plant (nearly $5 billion over-budget); the Long
Island Lighting Company's Shoreham nuclear power plant (approxi-
mately $4 billion over-budget and nine years behind schedule); and the
Michigan Consumers Power Company's Midland nuclear power plant
(over $4 billion over-budget and nine years behind schedule). 95 In-
dustry-wide, the Federal Energy Information Administration 96 has de-
termined that 36 of the 47 nuclear plants it surveyed cost at least
double their original projections. 197 Of that number, 13 were four
times as costly as initially estimated. 198 Clearly, the Court, in sanction-
ing economically motivated legislation as a basis for state regulation of
nuclear power, has given the states great latitude to control nuclear
power production within their boundaries.
Having put its predecessor case in the proper perspective, the
Silkwood Court's refusal to find preemption is more understandable.
While Pacic Gas showed that a state's avowed purpose for enacting
state regulatory legislation would not be closely scrutinized, t 99
Silkwood demonstrated that state regulation of nuclear safety concerns
was permissible, at least if indirectly asserted via punitive damages.
Thus, even though the Silkwood award regulated in what the Pacific
Gas Court described as the exclusive federal domain of plant operating
procedure, the Court refused to hold it preempted.
These two cases illustrate that, despite having articulated the two-
part preemption test in Paqfic Gas, the Court has declined to rigorously
194. Pulling the Nuclear Plug, TIME, Feb. 13, 1984 at 34 [hereinafter cited as TIME]. See also
The Price of Power, THE PROGRESSIVE, March, 1984 at 11-12; .4 Meltdown for Nuclear Power,
BUSINESS WEEK, January 30, 1984, at 18-19.
195. TIME, supra note 194, at 39.
196. This agency is a division of the United States Department of Energy.
197. TIME, supra note 194, at 39.
198. Id The Shoreham plant discussed above at supra note 185 and accompanying text is now
over 15 times as costly as originally planned with no guarantee that the price will not go even
higher. Id
199. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
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apply it in either instance. In Pacific Gas, the Court opened a door that
could conceivably allow any state to ban or significantly curtail the
adoption of nuclear power within its borders. Economically motivated
regulation of what is, by any definition, an economically sick industry
ought to survive the Court's application of the Pacific Gas preemption
test. Similarly, the Court in Silkwood effectively looked the other way
in allowing Oklahoma state tort law to impose a $10,000,000 "fine" on
a nuclear facility for its failure to adhere to a state created standard of
care. After Silkwood then, Pacfic Gas's definition of the preempted
field as "all nuclear safety concerns" appears to be all form and little
substance.
The State of the Law after Silkwood
As the outcome of Silkwood and Pacific Gas suggests, the analyti-
cal framework offered by the Court is less important to the preemption
question than the Court's general disposition to uphold state actions
facing preemption challenges. Thus far, the preemption law of the
1970s and 1980s has been characterized by a strong trend in favor of
upholding state law.200 Though very descriptive of the path apparently
adopted by the Court in these two cases, the weakness of such an out-
come-oriented approach is that its predictive capability is limited by
the duration of the trend.201 This shortcoming is particularly signifi-
cant given the fact that the Court's analytical treatment of the subject
matter would support a much broader application of preemption than
that found in either Pacfic Gas or Silkwood 20 2
With this weakness in mind, the Court's treatment of Silkwood
and Pacific Gas suggests that the Court will go to great lengths to place
any disputed state action outside the preempted area. In fact, the only
instance where the Court has thus far allowed preemption in the nu-
clear field is instructive of the Court's current view of the preemptive
scope of the Act. That case dealt with a legislative enactment passed
with an avowed purpose to regulate the safety aspects of a nuclear
plant's operation standards. The result in that case, Northern States
Power Company v. Minnesota,20 3 was reaffirmed by the Pacfic Gas
200. In addition to the analysis of the Silkwood and Pacific Gas cases, see supra notes 38-47
and accompanying text for the Court's recent treatment of preemption cases in other fields of law.
201. See supra notes 16-50 and accompanying text for an explanation of the various ap-
proaches adopted by the Supreme Court in preemption cases during this century.
202. See supra notes 184-99 and accompanying text.
203. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'dmem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). For further discussion of
this case and its holding, see supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
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Court in a footnote. 20 4 Thus, Silkwood and Pacific Gas indicate that the
preemptive scope of the Atomic Energy Act is apparently limited to
those facts. The lengths to which the Court went to uphold the state
action in Silkwood and Pacific Gas suggest that such a law would sur-
vive preemption. The Court would probably decide that, while regula-
tion for safety reasons alone is preempted by Northern States, the mere
presence of an avowed safety-related purpose does not require preemp-
tion if other valid, non-safety justifications will support the same asser-
tion of regulatory power. The Court could then resurrect the Pacific
Gas purpose-oriented analysis to uphold all elements of the regulatory
scheme for which there were non-safety justifications.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's analysis of the preemption question in
Silkwood demonstrates a decided willingness to allow greater state reg-
ulation of the nuclear power industry than that which had previously
been permissible under the Northern States decision. This result is in
line with the Court's general trend toward upholding, rather than pre-
empting, state law. However, in achieving this degree of outcome con-
tinuity, the Court sacrificed a sound intellectual treatment of the
subject matter in light of its recent prior decision in Pacfic Gas & Elec-
tric. As a result, Silkwood serves to obscure both the basis for its own
particular outcome, as well as the factors weighed by the Court in de-
ciding preemption cases in the nuclear field in general.
204. 103 S. Ct. at 212, n.24.
However, the specific result in Northern States has been overruled by the enactment of the
Clean Air Act amendments of 1977. In Northern States, Minnesota attempted to set stricter efflu-
ent standards for radioactive pollutants than did the N.R.C. The 1977 amendments modified the
definition of "air pollutant" to include "any radioactive ... substance or matter" emitted into the
ambient air. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (1982). Thus, under 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (1982), states may now set
their own effluent standards for radioactive pollutants provided that the state standard can never
be less stringent than the federal rules. Even if the state effluent standards are created for an
avowed safety purpose, they should survive a preemption challenge since Congress authorized the
states to assert such regulatory authority by passing the 1977 amendments.
